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A  ﬁerce  debate  is going  on  about  the  risks  of animal  husbandry  for  human  health  and  the  quality  of  control
measures  to reduce  such  risks.  Risks  include  the  occurrence  of  infectious  diseases,  in particular  zoonoses,
and the  high  antibiotic  use  in  livestock  production  contributing  to  emergence  of antibiotic  resistance  and
its spread  from  animals  to humans.  On the  other  hand,  many  infectious  diseases  of animals  and  humans
have  been  eliminated,  including  brucellosis,  tuberculosis,  leptospirosis,  and  BSE, resulting  in  an  animal
husbandry  that perhaps  has  never  been  as  safe  as nowadays.  So while  many  health  risks  have  been  brought
under  control,  the  public  opinion  appears  to  reﬂect  a feeling  of  anxiety  and  mistrust  in authorities  and
producers  to deal  with  the potential  and  remaining  public  health  risks  associated  with  animal  husbandry.
These  risks,  often  associated  with  the  intensiﬁcation  of animal  production,  are  nonetheless  indeed  real.
An animal  husbandry  that  is  “completely”  safe  and  healthy  for humans  and  animals  requires  a  central  role
for disease  prevention  in  the  design  and  management  of animal  husbandry  systems.  It  also  requires  that
rapid  and  adequate  responses  are  taken  by veterinary  and  medical  authorities  on both  perceived  and  realntibiotics risks. Communication  on  health  risks  must  be complete  and  open.  Because  actions  to protect  the  health
of  animals  often  also  beneﬁt  human  health,  there  is  usually  no conﬂict  of  interests  between  humans
and  animals  regarding  their  health  needs.  We  emphasize  the  need  to  use the  precautionary  principle  in
matters  of  human  and  animal  health.  This  implies  that  there  must  not  be a “clash  of cultures”  between
medical  and  veterinary  professionals  and  policy  makers.
© 2013 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Sciences. Published by Elsevier B.V.
 All rights reserved.
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. Introduction from 2007–2010 in the Netherlands during which approxi-
mately 10 people died. The epidemic was  eventually stoppedFrom time to time severe outbreaks of infectious diseases in
nimals occur. Sometimes such diseases spread from animals to
umans and may  impair human health and even cause fatal-
ties. A recent and dramatic example is the Q fever epidemic
∗ Corresponding author. Central Veterinary Institute, P.O. Box 65, 8200 AB
elystad, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31 3202 38069.
E-mail address: Tjeerd.Kimman@wur.nl (T. Kimman).
573-5214/$ – see front matter ©  2013 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Scienc
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2013.05.003by massive culling of goats [1]. Other examples include human
cases of avian inﬂuenza (AI), bovine spongiform encephalo-
pathy (BSE), hemolytic-uremic syndrome (HUS), caused by certain
Escherichia coli strains (O157:H7), and “old diseases”, such as
trichinellosis, toxoplasmosis, brucellosis, tuberculosis, and lepto-
spirosis [2,3]. These are all zoonoses, infectious diseases that are
able to spread from animals to man. Recently many emerging
and re-emerging infectious diseases of humans have originated
from animals, but the phenomenon is not new. Indeed many of
es. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Campylobacter spp. Many of these zoonoses originate from animal
husbandry: 44% of 86 zoonotic microorganisms identiﬁed in the
Netherlands occur in farm animals [12].T. Kimman et al. / NJAS - Wageninge
he present-day human pathogens (measles, respiratory syncytial
irus) originated from domesticated animals and evolved during
heir co-evolution with humans [4].
From the 18th till the 20th centuries, increased general hygiene
sewerage), better food production and handling (meat inspection,
ooling, pasteurization), speciﬁc disease control and eradication
rograms, and development of vaccines and antibiotics have
trongly reduced infectious diseases in humans and animals. Take
or example brucellosis and tuberculosis, diseases that can be
ontracted following the consumption of unpasteurized milk or
heese products made from unpasteurized milk and that may
esult in a chronic “wasting” illness. These diseases have been
argely eliminated by speciﬁc test and cull protocols of animals
nd the pasteurization of milk. Yet, while many infectious diseases,
ncluding zoonoses, have been brought under control (not nec-
ssarily by eradication), the recent occurrence of serious human
ases of zoonotic diseases appeared to have caused strong feel-
ngs of anxiety and even mistrust in authorities and producers
hose task it is to practice safe animal husbandry and provide
afe products of animal origin. More recently the occurrence of
nfections in humans with resistant bacteria of animal origin, such
s Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and bacte-
ia producing Extended Spectrum Beta-lactamases (ESBLs), have
ueled new and growing concerns among scientists, public health
fﬁcials and the general public on the wide use of antibiotics in
ivestock production that may  lead to the emergence of resistant
acteria in animals and their transfer to humans [5,6]. In addition
o MRSA and ESBLs, an increasing number of bacteria are becoming
esistant against a wide range of antibiotics, for example Enterobac-
eriaceae and Staphylococci.
In addition, other problems have added to create an image–not
er se wrong - that there are risks for both human and animal health
ssociated with intensive animal production. These are the occur-
ence of large outbreaks of–often non zoonotic- epidemic diseases,
uch as highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza, foot-and-mouth disease,
wine vesicular disease, and classical swine fever. These diseases
re brought under control by large scale culling of both infected and
usceptible animals. In addition, the up scaling and the intensiﬁca-
ion of animal production has led to the widespread occurrence of
o-called “production diseases”, animal pathologies that are linked
o intensive production systems and management practices. These
ay  lead to an increase in the occurrence of health risks for both
umans and animals. For example, the intensiﬁcation of produc-
ion has likely led to an increase in the occurrence of a wide range
f diseases, such as coccidiosis, salmonellosis, bacterial and viral
espiratory tract diseases, cryptosporidiosis, and mastitis, together
esulting in a high use of antibiotics. Factors in intensive animal
usbandry that affect the occurrence of infectious disease and its
ontrol include population density, animal movements, poor man-
gement and hygiene practices, and genetic constitutions that are
ne-sided directed at economic parameters.
Thus while many public and veterinary health risks associated
ith livestock production have been brought under control and
ave even been eradicated in some countries, one could call into
uestion whether there is a misconception between the current
erception of risks among the general public and the presence of
eal risks, and whether risks indeed have increased due to the inten-
iﬁcation of production processes. Or is it, perhaps, that our society
ncreasingly demands complete elimination of all remaining risks?
n this paper we reﬂect on several aspects concerning the health
isks associated with animal production, including their nature,
ransmission of threats from animals to humans, public aware-
ess and perception, and possible actions that can be taken to
afeguard both animal and human health. We  especially would
ike to emphasize two key points. Firstly, there is most often no
onﬂict of interests between humans and animals regarding theirnal of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 7– 14
health needs. It is clear that actions which protect the health of
animals often also protect human health. Thus actions to promote
human health mostly coincide with actions to promote animal
heath, and vice versa. Hence there is an absolute interconnectivity
(or, in Dutch, “lotsverbondenheid”) between the health of humans
and that of animals1. Secondly, we  promote the use of the pre-
cautionary principle in matters of human and animal health. This
implies that precautionary actions are taken proactively when an
activity may  raise threats of harm to human or animal health, even if
some cause and effect relationships have not been fully established
scientiﬁcally.
2. Nature of the risks for human and animal health
Traditionally health hazards for man  and animals are divided
in infectious and non-infectious diseases. The daily circumstances
in intensive livestock production systems, where many animals,
often without pre-existing immunity to speciﬁc microorganisms,
go through stressful transition moments (weaning, movements,
changing microbial environments) and live closely together, clearly
facilitate the occurrence, spread, and severity of many infectious
diseases. These diseases are often designated as endemic or produc-
tion diseases. The risk of such diseases may  be further increased by
unfavourable genetic, nutritional and management factors. Exam-
ples include neonatal mortality, weaning diarrhoea, and gut and
respiratory disorders caused or facilitated by a range of microbial
factors. While the impact on the health and well-being of animals
is clear, their risk for human health is usually more indirect, i.e.
mainly caused by the extensive use of antibiotics to prevent or treat
these disorders resulting in the emergence of resistant bacteria, and
transfer of such bacteria or the genetic elements carrying resistance
to humans. This may  eventually give rise to untreatable infections
among humans. While this scenario is now widely recognized to
be real and proven, and has resulted in a strong impetus to reduce
the use of antibiotics in animal husbandry, it must be emphasized
that the relation between animal consumption of antibiotics and
occurrence of resistant bacteria among humans is not simple. For
example, not using antibiotics will not immediately make the resis-
tant bacteria disappear from the farm [7], and we do not know what
extent of use will or will not lead to the development of resistance.
Another important sub-category of infectious diseases are the
zoonoses. These are common, which is biologically explained by the
close genetic and environmental relationship between humans and
animals causing that they may  share and exchange their pathogens.
Indeed the majority of pathogens known to affect humans are
zoonotic [8]. This category of diseases is wide, and hence their risks
for humans vary widely, from currently very infrequent (tuber-
culosis) to frequent (campylobacteriosis), and from severe (BSE,
Escherichia coli O157:H7, listeriosis) to mild (rotavirus) [9,10]. In
the Netherlands the number of conﬁrmed human zoonotic infec-
tions is estimated to be at least 1,000 persons/year and estimated to
rise due to increased human-animal contacts, tourism, expanding
trade, and growing consumption of animals and their products [11].
This number comprises frequent zoonoses as Q fever, toxoplasmo-
sis, toxocariosis, psittacosis and dermatomycoses, but not the very
frequently occurring foodborne infections due to Salmonella and1 There may  be rare exceptions in which the health and wellbeing of animals
and  humans are not per se in parallel. For instance, the welfare of chickens may
be  more optimal under free-range conditions, which however increases the risk of
introduction of avian inﬂuenza virus from wild birds, their mutation towards highly
pathogenic strains of AI, and their subsequent transfer to other poultry and humans.
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Some infectious animal diseases, such as foot-and-mouth dis-
ase, classical swine fever, African swine fever, and avian inﬂuenza,
ave serious consequences for animal health, as well as consider-
ble negative economic impact, and are therefore controlled under
ational and international regulations. Often these diseases are
ontrolled by the large-scale culling of infected animals and the
assive pre-emptive culling of animals at risk of spreading the
isease. Due to trade restrictions placed on vaccinated animals
nd their products, vaccination against such diseases is often not
llowed and under strict control of EU regulations. Some of these
iseases (avian inﬂuenza, Q fever and BSE) are zoonotic, in contrast
o foot-and-mouth disease, swine vesicular disease, and classical
wine fever. While these diseases are not zoonotic and pose no
irect threat to public health, the large-scale culling campaigns
ay  cause stress, fear, disgust and disapproval among the gen-
ral public. They may  also evoke psychological stress among those
harged with destroying so many–often healthy–animals, as well
s the farmers involved. Depression and even suicide among those
nvolved in this process have been documented [13,14]. Farmers
n affected farms may  further be anxious about the effects of these
ramatic events on their economic future.
It is known that livestock farmers and farm employees are at
igher risk of contracting some zoonotic diseases than the general
ublic because of their frequent and direct contact with animals.
he same is true for veterinarians and slaughterhouse personnel.
oncerns are growing, apparently associated with the increasing
f herd sizes, whether people living nearby intensive livestock
arms are at increased risk of contracting zoonotic diseases. How-
ver, at present there are insufﬁcient data available on the risk
f contracting zoonotic diseases for residents living in the vicin-
ty of farms [15]. Likewise it is unknown what the inﬂuence is of
isk factors, such as distance to the farm, the type of farming and
he size of the farming enterprise, on the chance of acquiring bird
u, psittacosis, campylobacteriosis, livestock-associated MRSA, and
SBL-producing bacteria. The only disease for which there are
trong indications that people living nearby infected farms are at
n increased risk of contracting it is Q fever [16]. Also, possible
inks between the presence of micro-organisms in the surrounding
nvironment of livestock farms and the degree to which zoonotic
nfections occur in neighbouring residents are unknown.
Bacteria resistant to one or more antibiotics may more easily
merge in intensive livestock production systems because they
ccur in higher frequencies in populations that are characterized
y a high antibiotic usage. This will lead to selection of resis-
ance among pathogens. Furthermore, a high density of individuals
ith close contacts and poor hygienic conditions are circumstances
hat facilitate the dissemination of resistance traits to different
acteria. Resistant bacteria from animals may  reach humans, for
xample through the consumption of meat, colonize the human
ut, and they may  then transfer plasmids carrying resistance genes
for example the vanA resistance gene cluster) to the commen-
al human bacterial microbiome or other pathogenic bacteria. The
egree of resistance among the commensal microbiome, such as E.
oli, Campylobacter spp., and enterococci, is a good indicator of the
election pressure caused by antibiotics and for resistance among
athogenic bacteria [17]. This is because the commensal micro-
iome of humans and animals is a reservoir of resistance genes for
athogenic bacteria [18]. The degree of resistance in the commen-
al microbiome is therefore monitored regularly in many countries,
ncluding the Netherlands [19].
A special remark needs to be made about the risk of animal dis-
ases as a source of completely new emerging diseases in humans
20]. These interspeciﬁc transmissions from animal to man  are
ifﬁcult to predict and an event for which we  have no idea of
ow to prevent it. An example is the anticipated next pandemic
f human inﬂuenza. Although we know about transmission tonal of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 7– 14 9
humans of avian and mammalian strains of inﬂuenza, we have no
idea when and what will trigger the next pandemic of inﬂuenza
among humans [21,22].
Thus, we  conclude that infectious diseases in livestock can have
an impact on (1) the general public and those living in the vicinity
of farms, which has up to now only clearly been proven to occur for
Q-fever, (2) consumers of animal products, which has been shown
for many zoonoses such as EHEC, contaminated food, and antibi-
otic resistance, (3) professionals working in the livestock industry
that are at risk for contracting diseases that require close contact
with animals, for example avian inﬂuenza, MRSA and listeriosis,
and (4) the animals themselves, who may  suffer and produce less
favourably.
Finally, there is a range of–often less well–characterized non-
infectious hazards that may  threaten the health of animals and
humans working or living on or nearby farms. Also consumers of
animal products may  be affected by non-infectious health hazards.
This hazard category includes intoxications, for example dioxin,
gaseous emissions (such as ammonia), and emissions of small-sized
particulate matter (incl. endotoxins) in and around stables. The
extent of the public health impact of such hazards is still not yet
fully understood and is now subject of many studies and debates. It
seems evident however that the negative effects of gaseous emis-
sions are larger for the animals and workers in the farm than for
surrounding residents.
3. Risk assessment
Risk assessments analyses may  help in judging health hazards
from the livestock industry and their consequences in an objective
and measurable way. Risk assessment may  thus be instrumental in
pointing the way where to intervene, in allocating funds for con-
trol activities, as well as in identifying knowledge gaps to which
research activities should be directed. Evidently people tend to be
risk adverse with the ultimate aim to avoid harm, and they appear
to do so more and more often. The process of a risk assessment
comprises of several steps, beginning with identifying and char-
acterizing the hazard, including the speciﬁcs of its life cycle. Next
steps are an entry assessment (how can the hazard come into con-
tact with an animal or a human, how many different entry pathways
exist, and which are the most likely to occur?), an exposure assess-
ment (how frequent and in what quantities does exposure occur?),
and a consequence assessment (what is the impact of exposure?).
Such assessments result in a risk estimation, which can either be
qualitative or quantitative, telling whether the hazard poses a risk
for animal or human health and whether or not mitigating or con-
trol measures need to be taken. Evidently, risk assessments cannot
identify hazards for us, or predict the emergence of yet unidenti-
ﬁed hazards. Neither can they tell us how to intervene to mitigate
the risk or impact associated with a hazard. It can merely tell us
where to intervene and what the goal of the intervention needs to
be, e.g. a reduction in Salmonella growth of x-% on chicken breasts
during packaging. Neither can risk assessments reduce the variabil-
ity surrounding a hazard identiﬁed. Nature, and all living things, is
unpredictable, and no matter how much data were collected and
used for the risk assessment, at some point we will always be left
with variability in the outcome. The usefulness of risk assessments
therefore stands or falls with the correct identiﬁcation of a haz-
ard, its parameters and collected data, the model build to include
the parameters, and the interpretation of the outcomes of the risk
assessment. Thus the biggest uncertainty in risk analysis is whether
we started off analysing the right thing and in the right way  [23].
The ﬁnal stage, risk communication, is perhaps the most underes-
timated aspect of a risk assessment (see below). The results need to
be presented in an easy understandable way, particularly for those
responsible for the implementation of control measures.
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A good example of the use of risk analysis concerns the Bovine
pongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) epidemic in Europe during the
980’s, a disease that was until then unknown. This serious disease
or cattle was newly detected in the UK in the eighties of the last
entury [24] had been shown to be zoonotic and cause a quickly
rogressing and fatal new variant of Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease in
umans [25]. Disease eradication proved to be the strategy of choice
or BSE in cattle. Results or risk assessments indicated that trans-
ission of BSE occurred through the feed chain: brains of diseased
nimals ended up (processed) in the extra protein feed that was
iven to high producing dairy cattle. The risk of contracting the
isease after consumption of meat from affected animals was very
ow, but neither heating nor freezing had little, if any, risk miti-
ating effect. These studies also helped identifying animals most
t risk of having the disease and therefore being able to transmit
he disease. Diagnostic methods for live animals were not available
nd thus all slaughtered animals were tested and diseased animals
ere kept out of the human food and the cattle feed chain. In combi-
ation with other measures, such as keeping all ruminant material
ut of the ruminant feed chain, this has led to eradication of BSE
nd new variant of Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease in humans.
The example of BSE illustrates that special attention for health
isks is needed when major changes in husbandry systems are
ntroduced. Such periods pose a risk for the occurrence of unknown
isks or the enhanced expression of previously unknown risk fac-
ors. In the case of BSE changes in the handling of cadavers led to
he BSE crisis. Another example is the fast and strong expansion of
he milk goat husbandry in the Netherlands leading to the largest
uman Q fever outbreak ever.
Another, more recent example is the risk analysis of Schmallen-
erg virus for humans. The virus had not been detected in Europe
efore 2011. The virus adversely affects the unborn lambs and
alves. A quick risk analysis estimated the risk for humans, and in
articular pregnant women, to be negligible. Evidently, a different
utcome would have had a major impact on the control measures
aken.
In the Netherlands risk assessments are primarily used to inform
olicy makers on the risks and desirability of control measures con-
erning exotic diseases, such as Rift Valley fever virus, Crimean
ongo haemorrhagic fever and West Nile virus, and to assess the
isk of re-introduction of highly contagious notiﬁable diseases such
s classical swine fever and foot-and-mouth disease. Some exam-
les are illustrated in Table 1.
. Possibilities for intervention
For interventions in the occurrence of infectious diseases it is
mportant to set a clear goal, to consider beforehand whether or
ot these goals can be achieved, and to check that these goals are
chieved after implementation. The most stringent intervention is
hat we attempt to eradicate the infectious agent from the animal
opulation. Often this is only possible when there is no wildlife
eservoir and it is only considered when the impact of the disease
n humans or animals is very severe. Eradication is mostly done
n a certain area (e.g. a country) and trade restrictions are used to
solate the free area(s) from infected areas. In the past, eradica-
ion of bovine tuberculosis (bTb, caused by Mycobacterium bovis)
rom cattle in developing countries, including the Netherlands, has
een achieved by a test and cull strategy. This implies that infected
nimals are identiﬁed and are then removed from the population
efore they can infect more than one other animal. For infections
ith slow dynamics and good diagnostic tools this approach is
ossible. Whereas bTb may  have been the ﬁrst eradicated disease
n farmed animals there have been other diseases where this has
een done successfully. For example also Brucella abortus and Lep-
ospira Hardjo have been eradicated from the cattle population innal of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 7– 14
The Netherlands using this test and cull strategy. Currently, there
are increasing problems with countries that fail to progress with
bTb eradication due to wildlife reservoirs: badgers in Europe, pos-
sums in New Zealand, and elk and deer in North America [26]. In
these circumstances additional control measures seem necessary
to achieve eradication. As culling wildlife is not popular or feasible,
other possibilities are examined such as vaccinating wildlife [27],
either with or without vaccinating cattle.
Several countries have started programs to reduce other
zoonotic bacteria such as certain species and variants of Salmonella
spp, Campylobacter spp and Escherichia coli. Often eradication is not
mentioned as the target because this target does not seem attain-
able. The target that is mentioned is risk mitigation for consumers
of animal products [28]. This is achieved by detecting elevated lev-
els of these bacteria and excluding farms or production groups with
higher levels of infection from the food production chain.
Vaccination is another possibility to eradicate infectious dis-
eases in animals. If effective vaccines are available, they can be used
to stop outbreaks of animal diseases. This is the case for classical
swine fever virus [29,30], foot-and-mouth disease virus [31–34], or
highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus [35]. Also for endemic dis-
eases vaccination has been used in combination with other control
measures to eradicate them. The prominent examples for where it
has succeeded are pseudorabies virus (PRV or Aujeszky’s disease
virus) in the Netherlands [36,37], and rinderpest worldwide [38].
After a recent introduction of blue tongue virus type 8 in North West
Europe it is attempted to control this epidemic by vaccination also.
Vaccination of goats against Q fever has also been used, not with the
target of eradication, but to prevent abortions and therewith large-
scale shedding during lambing in order to prevent transmission to
humans.
For animal diseases that are a public health threat vaccination
tends to be viewed with suspicion as it might be that vaccination
only reduces clinical symptoms (which otherwise might be a justi-
ﬁed goal of using vaccines), but does not stop transmission of the
pathogen. Furthermore vaccination may  interfere with possibilities
to diagnose the infection. Therefore, vaccines nowadays are mostly
developed together with a diagnostic test that can detect infection
in vaccinated animals [39]. In the example of PRV we were able to
show that even when virus replication is not completely stopped
in individual hosts we can quantify transmission [36] and are able
to eradicate the virus from a country using these vaccines. Math-
ematical modelling has been a useful tool in this process because
progress in the ﬁeld could be compared to the expected progress
calculated by extrapolating results from transmission experiments
and ﬁeld observations. However, up to now eradication by vaccina-
tion has not been attempted for diseases that pose a public health
treat. As mentioned above in the case of bTb, vaccination of cattle
may  be necessary to maintain a bTb free status in cattle in the face
of bTb infection in wildlife.
Antibiotic treatment, either of the whole population or of the
infected animals, could be a possibility to deal with zoonotic infec-
tious agents. However, this is not a preferred option because of
the development of antibiotic resistance. Also it seems rational to
reserve those antibiotics that work in humans for humans and not
to use them in animals. From a theoretical point of view it can
be said that any set of measures that effectively controls an infec-
tious agent will also preclude the development of resistance against
these control measures. Development of vaccine escape, i.e. resis-
tance against vaccination, will only occur when transmission occurs
in spite of vaccination. This could be the case when the vaccination
misses part of the population or when vaccination is suboptimal
in some animals only, for example because of quality issues, e.g. a
not properly maintained cold-chain. The same principle may  apply
to antibiotics. Use of antibiotics should be restricted as much as
possible because it always, but in particular when application is
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Table  1
Examples in which risk-analysis has contributed to the protection of animal and human health.
Hazard identiﬁed Potential consequences Risk assessment Measures taken
Q-fever Serious illness in humans Medium risk Vaccination, testing and culling of
affected animals
Antibiotic (multi-) resistance Emergence of untreatable illnesses High risk Antibiotic reduction strategy
Bacterial foodborne diseases
(salmonellosis, campylobacteriosis,
listeriosis)
Mild to serious illness in humans Variable risk Various control strategies
Products from vaccinated animals,
vaccinated against a former OIE list A
disease, for example classical swine
fever
Spread of disease due to trade in
animals with subclinical wild virus
infections
Negligible risk Discussion on implementing
emergency vaccination instead of
culling
Rift  Valley fever, a mosquito borne
zoonosis.
Serious illness in farm animals and
humans
Low risk (for the Netherlands) Mosquito surveillance in the
Netherlands, control of identiﬁed
imported exotic mosquitos
Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever, a Serious illness in humans Low risk (for the Netherlands) Tick surveillance in the Netherlands
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Malaria Serious illness in humans 
uboptimal (for example low dosages), may  result in development
f antibiotic resistance. In humans it cannot be avoided to apply
ntibiotics that eventually do not work, as everything possible will
e attempted to help the patient. In farm animals antibiotic use
hould be avoided as much as possible, especially whenever it is
ot fully effective, as eventually we are better off when only effec-
ive control measures are applied and resistance development is
voided.
. Perception, acceptance and communication of risks
The actual number of fatal human cases due to, for example
SE and avian inﬂuenza, is very limited. However, the ﬁnancial and
ogistic efforts to combat these and other notiﬁable diseases have
een very high in for example The Netherlands and the UK. The eco-
omic damage due to the Dutch avian inﬂuenza epidemic in 2003
as excessive. A total of 255 infected poultry herds were culled,
nd 1,255 commercial and 17,000 hobby farms were culled as a pre-
ention measure. Together 31 million chickens, ducks and turkeys
ere killed. The economic losses were estimated to approximate
undreds of millions of euros. Evidently such disease outbreaks
ause considerable public concern.
In contrast, the public’s concerns on the risks associated with
ommon foodborne infections, such as salmonellosis and campy-
obacteriosis, appear somewhat less prominent. However, such
iseases cause a considerable and regular number of human infec-
ions and fatalities. In the Netherlands the number of fatal cases
f salmonellosis and campylobacteriosis amounts to an estimated
umber of 80-90 persons per year [9,10,40]. In the absence of
ystematic research on the perceptions of citizens on the risks asso-
iated with living in the vicinity of farms or consuming animal
roducts, such anecdotal observations may  evoke some thoughts
n the perception of public health threats originating from animal
usbandry.
It appears that there are discrepancies between the real risks
associated with animal husbandry and their perception in the
public opinion. Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases of
animals appear to frighten the public. Citizens no longer want
to accept the threat of infectious diseases, in particular when TV
broadcasts show images of the large scale culling of animals. Such
TV broadcasts appear to frighten and anger people, even when
there is no immediate public health risk or when healthy animals
are killed for prevention because vaccination is not allowed. Thus
media appear to magnify emotions.
For experts the perception and acceptance of risks by the gen-
eral public does not always appear logical. Perhaps the nearnessigh risk through international
r-travel
Fumigation of aircrafts, uptake of
prophylactic medication by travellers
or unfamiliarity with events (‘fear of the unknown’), play critical
roles in the public’s perception and acceptance of risks. Also risks
that are out of self-control appear to be valued stronger and more
negative and hence less accepted (e.g. compare airplane travel
and car travel). Likely, the acceptance of livestock-associated
health risks may  be related to the appreciation of livestock farm-
ing.
• Nowadays citizens, consumers of animal products, and neigh-
bours of farms simply demand that they do not become ill of
farms in their vicinity, that their health is not adversely affected
following the consumption of products from animal origin or
from the way  in which they are produced. In earlier times infec-
tious diseases originating from animals may  have been regarded
as normal “facts-of-life”. Nowadays the public appears to accept
fewer of such risks than before, demands quick and drastic meas-
ures to control and prevent real and perceived threats, and wants
to identify and blame culprits. Foremost the public demands com-
plete and open communication [41,42].
• So demands are shifting and contextual. For example, the culling
of goats for Q fever control appeared better accepted in the pub-
lic’s opinion (because it constituted a real public health threat)
than the culling of swine to control an outbreak of classical swine
fever (no danger for man).
• The attitude towards livestock-associated risks may  differ
between persons (including veterinary experts) working in live-
stock industry or elsewhere, for example in public health.
Perhaps–according to contemporary demands - the attitude
towards risks associated with livestock production is sometimes
even somewhat too lax or too little among professionals work-
ing in the livestock industry. For example, veterinary experts
and authorities involved in the control of the Dutch Q fever
outbreak who were inclined to support farmers, appeared to
respond somewhat slower and less adequate than public health
experts [42]. Otherwise, veterinarians may have more knowledge
on zoonoses than medical professionals. These observations may
point to a “clash of cultures” between those who  approach these
matters from the animal production or the public health perspec-
tive [42,43]. If true, this demands actions to be taken to improve
the conscientiousness and attitude of those working in the live-
stock industry regarding public health risks, as well as knowledge
on zoonoses among medical professionals.
• Government authorities and producers can no longer rely on
blind faith from a more and more critical public in these mat-
ters. Society demands that both structural public health threats
and calamities are managed adequately and that communica-
tion in these matters is open and fair. The public also wants to
be included in discussions on intensive livestock production and
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their associated risks. Without doubt, knowledge on factual risks
and the public’s perception of risks may  help enabling a balanced
discussion on the risks associated with animal production in rela-
tion to other public health risks. Clearly there are uncertainties
regarding both infectious diseases and the public’s opinion about
their risks. Evidently communication should be clear on aspects
where knowledge of risks is still insufﬁcient, take for example the
unknown burden of disease of animal hepatitis E infections and
its zoonotic risk, or the threat of antibiotic resistance in humans
due to antibiotic use in animals. Producers, experts and authori-
ties have to take these concerns seriously. Thus, both experts and
the public need sufﬁcient and objective knowledge to be able to
assess the health risks of livestock production.
. Guaranteeing safety
A frequently expressed wish from consumers and producers of
nimal products is “guaranteed safe”. Although safety can never be
uaranteed completely due to failures or the inherent variability
ssociated in everything and anything alive, producers can strive to
ttain maximal safety by reducing the probability of unacceptable
isks occurring. Therefore consensus is needed on the risks that
re considered unacceptable, what costs we are willing to make in
rder to reduce these risks, and what responsibility consumers are
illing to take in order to further reduce the risks associated with
he preparation and consumption of animal products.
To reduce the risk to health to currently acceptable levels, pro-
ucing, processing and storing protocols have been made for all
oodstuffs. An example of this is the development of HACCP. This
tands for Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points. Common
nterventions at critical control points include freezing, cooling,
eat treatment, chemical treatment and radiation treatment of
pices. It is clear, however, that in animal production safety proto-
ols must not be restricted to the later stages of animal production
when the animals have been slaughtered or milk collected), but
ust be operative in the whole production chain (thus “from seed
o feed”).
One way to establish public trust and a means to assure the
ealth of animals on farms and the safety of their products is by
ertiﬁcation programs. However, at present, consumers in super-
arkets are confronted with a proliferating array of certiﬁcation
rograms and quality marks. Each has their own aims and charac-
eristics, but they are often aimed at demonstrating animal welfare
nd environmentally responsible production. We  consider this
lethora of certiﬁcates undesirable, and pledge for one single certi-
cation program for products of animal origin, like the certiﬁcation
rogram of the Marine Stewardship Council [44] for ﬁsh, to recog-
ise and reward sustainable farming. Such a single program may
romote the best choices regarding the protection of human and
nimal health, animal welfare and environmental protection. Such
 program may  also be invaluable in promoting a responsible atti-
ude towards public health issues among workers in the livestock
roduction sectors. In the establishment of such a program, dilem-
as  between several aspects may  arise and have to be resolved.
illingness to compromise is necessary here. Whatever choices in
stablishing such a program are made, the minimum requirement
s that both the way of producing and the product itself are safe
or public health according to current standards. Preferably such a
ertiﬁcation program should be available on an European or even
lobal level.. Discussion and future perspectives
Responsibility for safeguarding health of humans and animals
rom the risks associated with animal husbandry lies obviouslynal of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 7– 14
with a variety of actors, especially with the producers in the whole
production chain, as well as with government and the state run
veterinary services. However, consumers also have their respon-
sibilities. They need to get accurate information on the safety of
animal husbandry and its products, including information about
safe product handling and consumption habits. Finally, the media
need to be helpful in reporting accurately and informatively.
Transmission of pathogens from animals to man and vice versa,
and the transmission of genetic elements (carrying resistance or
virulence between pathogens) is a fact of life. This applies to all
animals and their pathogens, i.e. wild animals and pets also, and
not only to farmed animals [20]. Such exchange events therewith
pose a natural risk for humans living and working on farms or in
the vicinity of farms, for consumers of products of animal origin,
and the human population in general. However, circumstances in
modern livestock production practices may  favour such events, and
they should thus be controlled. The intensiﬁcation of animal hus-
bandry and the close contacts between humans and farmed animals
and their products warrant special attention to the safety of farm
animal production. Very many of such public health threats have
already been brought under control in most developed countries,
for example anthrax, tuberculosis, listeriosis, brucellosis, BSE, etc.
[3]. Therewith one could say that livestock production nowadays is
“safer than ever”. Nonetheless, intensiﬁcation of production, asso-
ciated “production diseases”, high use of antibiotics, emergence of
antibiotic resistance, new and re-emerging diseases and zoonoses
(Q fever), and remaining old problems such as foodborne infec-
tions (salmonellosis, campylobacteriosis) are strong incentives to
strive towards an animal production sector that is both “safe and
healthy” for man  and animals. Public trust in animal production
is clearly needed to assure its “license–to-produce”, particularly in
a densely populated country. This will be challenging to achieve
because people appear to accept fewer and fewer risks while their
perception of risks is subject to strong emotions.
As mentioned, we strongly like to argue that the interconnec-
tivity between the health of humans and that of animals excludes
contrasting views regarding health issues or a clash of cultures
between veterinary and medical professionals and policy mak-
ers. In matters where human health is at stake, we  consider that
the right attitude towards livestock-associated risks demands the
precautionary principle, which implies that there is a social respon-
sibility to protect the public from exposure to harm when scientiﬁc
investigation has found a plausible risk. Following this principle we
need to take, for example, action to control livestock-associated
MRSA infections. Not because we know all the risks, their mag-
nitudes and modes of action associated with this infection, but
because the presumed risks are real and the circumstances in live-
stock production may  favour the emergence of similar and more
resistant bacteria. Thus, in order to restore public conﬁdence in
the safety of livestock production and to safeguard its “license-to-
produce” we are obliged to take the safe side.
The role and position of the primary producers justiﬁes special
attention. Their position in providing a safe animal husbandry pro-
ducing safe products in a clean environment is both central and
precarious because of their economic risks. Society’s demands on
primary producers needs to be supported with an earnest income
and other means of support, for example a system of “blame-free”
reporting of diseases.
Criteria and standards, for example used in a certiﬁcation pro-
gram aimed at safeguarding human health, need to be clear and
unambiguous. However, such criteria and standards are subject to
discussion and dynamic change. Not only pathogens evolve, but
also animal husbandry systems (more or less favouring pathogens
and certain risk factors), the public’s perceptions and demands
regarding risks, and the scientiﬁc knowledge regarding health risks
and their control strategies. Furthermore, on many aspects more
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nowledge is needed, for example on the human health risks
f certain pathogens (hepatitis E virus, toxoplasmosis, Chlamydia
nfections), on the transmission routes of resistant bacteria and the
enetic elements carrying resistance from animals to man, on the
esign of safe husbandry systems, on the role of genetic and nutri-
ional factors in promoting animal health, on vaccine development,
tc. [6].
We propose to develop livestock production systems that are
ntrinsically designed to limit the occurrence and severity of infec-
ious diseases, the transfer of pathogens from animals to man, and
he need to use antibiotics. This requires not only crisis manage-
ent of acute disease outbreaks, but also design of “disease-free”
ystems with genetically resistant animals, systematic prevention
f production-associated diseases, and adequate early warning
ystems. Risk assessment studies may  help to identify, character-
ze and quantify livestock-associated health hazards and factors
avouring their occurrence, and so help identifying ways for pre-
enting them.
A more widespread design and use of systems aimed at
reventing the occurrence and severity of diseases, such as speciﬁc-
athogen-free (SPF) or minimal disease systems, may  be a good
pproach to reach many of these goals [45,46]. Furthermore, these
ystems may  also have a favourable impact on feed conversion,
he carbon footprint and economic results of farms. In addition to
liminating speciﬁc pathogens, disease-preventive measures and
ystems need to be further developed. These may  comprise of, for
xample, systematic vaccination schedules, timely and adequate
edical treatments (also aimed at prevention of pathogen trans-
ission and emergence of resistance), good housing, a high level
f biosecurity, adequate feeding and clean drinking water, animal
ransport and contact structures aimed at reducing pathogen trans-
ission, adequate management of transition moments (such as
eaning), breeding for disease-resistance, etc. Evidently, proof of
ffectiveness of such measures needs to be delivered, which may
ot always be easy and may  require new research [47–49]. Thus, all
easures aimed at disease reduction should, as much as possible,
e cost-effective and “evidence-based”.
In conclusion, improving animal health goes hand in hand with
mproving human health. Conscientious managing animal health in
odern, intensive livestock farming will give the animal all essen-
ial care it requires. Eventually this will beneﬁt the public’s health
nd its conﬁdence in livestock production.
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